

Message Text

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66/46

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 /026 W

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O P 201740 Z MAR 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1876

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T USDEL SALT TWO II 0106

EXDIS SALT

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -- PARA SIX --

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SALT: MEETING OF MARCH 20, 1973

1. SUMMARY. SEMENOV DEVOTED STATEMENT TO FBS. HE SAID ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE SOLUTION OF PERMANENT AGREEMENT TO CERTAIN GROUPS OF NUMBERS BASED UPON ONE- SIDED VIEW. INTERIM AGREEMENT SOLVED CERTAIN SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF STRATEGIC SITUATION BY POSTPONING THEIR SOLUTION TO NEXT PHASE. IN PUTTING ASIDE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE SIDES AND LIQUIDATION OF RELEVANT BASES IN THIRD COUNTRIES, SOVIET SIDE HAD IN MIND THAT INTERIM AGREEMENT INITIATED DETENTE AND IT HOPED THAT THIS PROCESS WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION IN FUTURE. SEMENOV GAVE FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS REGARDING US OVERSEAS SLBM BASES, FORWARD- BASED AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES, AND ATTACK CARRIERS AND PRESENTED THREE PROPOSALS: 1) WITHDRAWAL OF SLBM SUBMARINES AND LIQUIDATION OF THEIR BASES IN THIRD COUNTRIES; 2) WITHDRAWAL OF NUCLEAR- ARMED AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES WHOSE LOCATION PERMITS STRIKING TERRITORY OF OTHER SIDE AND LIQUIDATION OF RELEVANT BASES IN THIRD

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COUNTRIES; 3) WITHDRAWAL OF ATTACK CARRIERS AND LIMITATION OF SUCH CARRIERS AND THEIR AIRCRAFT TO AGREED LEVELS FOR BOTH SIDES. US PRESENTED NO FORMAL STATEMENT. JOHNSON EXPRESSED GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT THAT SOVIETS HAD AGAIN SOUGHT TO AVOID CENTRAL ISSUES AND HAD NOT REACTED TO US PROPOSALS. HE REITERATED SMITH STATEMENTS THAT NON- CENTRAL SYSTEMS ARE NOT STRATEGIC AND THAT ASYMMETRIES DO NOT FAVOR US. HE AGAIN URGED THAT WE PUT THIS ISSUE ASIDE AND DEAL WITH CENTRAL SYSTEMS. END SUMMARY.

2. SEMENOV DEVOTED STATEMENT TO FBS AND PUT FORWARD THREE PROPOSALS ON SUBJECT. HE SAID IT HAD BEEN CORRECTLY POINTED OUT IN HELSINKI AND VIENNA THAT SO- CALLED " CONSERVATIVE APPROACH" IS NOT SUITABLE. AS IS KNOWN, CERTAIN QUARTERS WHO WERE ADVOCATES OF COLD WAR POLICY SUGGESTED THE USE OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND OTHER FACTORS TO BREAK THROUGH TO A HIGHER PLATEAU AND TO CONTINUE THE POLICY OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE. HOWEVER, BUILDING UP OF SUCH FORCES DOES NOT LEAD TO ENHANCEMENT OF ACTUAL SECURITY AND IDEA OF " OVERKILL" IS IRRATIONAL. SEMENOV SAID HE SAW NO DISAGREEMENT HERE REGARDING PRINCIPLES OF EQUAL SECURITY AND NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, ALTHOUGH THERE EXIST DIFFERING VIEWS ON CONCRETE ASPECTS OF QUESTIONS INVOLVED. CONTINUING INTEREST OF SIDES IN CURBING STRATEGIC ARMS RACE IS BEYOND DOUBT.

3. HE STATED WHAT IS SUFFICIENT FOR AN INTERIM AGREEMENT IS NO DOUBT NOT SUFFICIENT FOR A PERMANENT ONE. ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE SOLUTION TO CERTAIN GROUPS OF NUMBERS IS BASED UPON ONE- SIDED VIEW. INTERIM AGREEMENT SOLVED CERTAIN QUESTIONS RELATED TO TWO TYPES OF ARMS AND LEFT ASIDE CERTAIN SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF STRATEGIC SITUATION BY POSTPONING THEIR SOLUTION TO NEXT PHASE. IN PUTTING ASIDE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE SIDES AND LIQUIDATION OF RELEVANT BASES IN THIRD COUNTRIES, SOVIET SIDE HAD IN MIND THAT INTERIM AGREEMENT INITIATED DETENTE AND IT HOPED THAT THIS PROCESS WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION IN FUTURE. IN CONTEXT OF NEW PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS, SITUATION IN WHICH ONE SIDE MOVES UP NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO FRONTIER OF THE OTHER CANNOT BE CONSIDERED NORMAL OR CONSISTENT WITH INTERESTS OF SECURITY AND PEACE.

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4. TURNING TO SPECIFIC SYSTEMS, SEMENOV SAID PRESENCE OF

BASES FOR SLBM SUBMARINES IN THIRD COUNTRIES INCREASES OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF SUCH SUBMARINES AND IS IN EFFECT TANTAMOUNT TO INCREASE IN NUMBER OF SUBMARINES FOR ONE OF SIDES. HE CALLED ATTENTION TO SOVIET STATEMENT OF MAY 26, 1972, TO EFFECT THAT INTERIM AGREEMENT ONLY PARTIALLY COMPENSATES FOR STRATEGIC IMBALANCE DUE TO SUCH BASES. WITHDRAWAL OF SLBM SUBMARINES WITHIN AGREED LIMITS AND LIQUIDATION OF RELEVANT BASES IN THIRD COUNTRIES WOULD REMOVE CERTAIN INCENTIVES TO ARMS RACE AND FACILITATE CONSIDERABLY SOLUTION OF OTHER QUESTIONS CONCERNING LIMITATION OF OFFENSIVE ARMS.

5. SEMENOV GAVE FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS ON WITHDRAWAL OF FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES AND LIQUIDATION OF THEIR BASES AND REFERRED TO "SEVERAL THOUSAND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TOGETHER WITH MEANS OF DELIVERY" STATIONED NEAR BORDER OF ONE SIDE. SOVIET SIDE CONSIDERS SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS IN PERMANENT AGREEMENT "ORGANICALLY LINKED" TO QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF FBS AND LIQUIDATION OF RELEVANT BASES. HE THEN ARGUED FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND, IN NEW WRINKLE, ESTABLISHMENT OF NUMERICAL LIMITS ON THEM AND THEIR AIRCRAFT.

6. SEMENOV CONCLUDED WITH THREE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS:

1) WITHDRAWAL BY AGREED DATE OF SLBM SUBMARINES TO BEYOND AGREED LIMITS AND LIQUIDATION OF THEIR FORWARD BASES IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

2) WITHDRAWAL TO NATIONAL TERRITORY BY AGREED DATE OF AIRCRAFT AND ANY MISSILES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHOSE LOCATION PERMITS STRIKING TERRITORY OF OTHER SIDE AND LIQUIDATION OF RELEVANT BASES IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

3) WITHDRAWAL OF ATTACK CARRIERS BEYOND AGREED LIMITS TO PRECLUDE THEIR AIRCRAFT FROM STRIKING TERRITORY OF OTHER SIDE AND LIMITATION OF ATTACK CARRIERS AND THEIR AIRCRAFT WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO AGREED LEVELS FOR BOTH SIDES.

7. US DELEGATION PRESENTED NO FORMAL STATEMENT. AT CONCLUSION OF SOVIET STATEMENT, JOHNSON SAID HE WAS VERY DIS-
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APPOINTED THAT SOVIETS HAD AGAIN SOUGHT TO AVOID CENTRAL ISSUES, ON WHICH US HAD MADE SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS. US DELEGATION HAD SUGGESTED AGREE
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS

*** Current Classification *** SECRET

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 29 MAR 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973SALTT00106
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: CORE6
Film Number: n/a
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730333/aaaaiaic.tel
Line Count: 166
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 03 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03-Aug-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <17-Sep-2001 by boyleja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> srp 971215
Subject: SALT: MEETING OF MARCH 20, 1973
TAGS: PARM
To: SECSTATE WASHDC
SS INFO MOSCOW
USNATO
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005